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ABSTRACT Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a very attractive cryptographic primitive due to its unnecessity of any certificate managements. Nevertheless, the user revocation problem in IBE remains an elusive
research problem and hence, it is an important research topic. One possible approach in achieving revocations
is to update user’s decryption keys. However, to avoid the need of secret channels, public time keys need to
be issued to allow this update to occur. It is unfortunate that this method often suffers from two problems:
1) the user has to maintain linearly growing decryption keys; and 2) the revoked users can still access
ciphertexts prior to revocation. At the first glance, proxy re-encryption technique may provide a solution
to this problem, but the ciphertexts will become longer after each re-encryption, which makes it impractical.
In this paper, we present a revocable identity-based encryption scheme with cloud-aided ciphertext evolution.
Our construction solves the two aforementioned problems via ciphertext evolution implemented by the cloud.
In addition, the size of ciphertexts in the cloud remains constant size regardless of evolutions. The scheme
is provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks based on the BDH problem. The comparisons with the
existing related works show that our scheme enjoys better efficiency, and thus it is practical for the data
sharing in cloud storage.
INDEX TERMS CCA, ciphertext evolution, cloud, identity-based encryption, revocable.
I. INTRODUCTION

Public key encryption (PKE) provides an excellent solution to
the problem of key distribution in symmetric key. An important issue in PKE is the authenticity of user public keys. The
traditional PKE authenticates user public key via releasing
certificates. Nevertheless, the certificate management is a
heavy burden to the public key system, which is the primary
drawback in PKE. To overcome this drawback, Shamir set
forth a new notion called ‘‘Identity based public key cryptography’’ in 1984 [16]. This public key cryptosystem employs
every user’s unique identity as its public key. Therefore,
the authenticity of this public key is no longer questionable,
and hence, there is no certificate required. Since the first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme was presented
by Boneh and Franklin [3] in 2001, IBE has attracted a lot
of attentions from both academia and industry. To date, there
have been many IBE schemes proposed in the literature such
as [2] and [4]–[7]. One important issue to make identity-based
encryption practical is the user revocation. This problem was
first discussed in BF’s seminal work [3]. As stated earlier,
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different from the traditional public key system, there is
no certificate in identity-based system. Therefore, the conventional user revocation technique is not applicable to the
identity-based systems. Actually, the user private key can
be viewed as an implicit certificate. Boneh and Franklin
suggested that the PKG periodically issues new private keys
by attaching time tags for non-revoked users. The user revocation can be launched by the PKG stoping the issuing of
new user private keys with the time tags. Unfortunately, this
revocation system is very impractical, because the PKG has
to carry heavy overhead (O(n) where n is the number of
non-revoked users), especially for the establishing of secret
channels. Boldyreva et al. [1] presented the first scalable
revocable IBE scheme in 2008. In their scheme, only public
channels are required for the key-updating. Furthermore, they
utilized the complete subtree to realize a logarithm growth
O(log(n)) of key-updating with non-revoked users.
With this approach of revocation method, many revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) schemes have been
proposed. However, when taking these schemes in some
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application scenarios, some problems arise. Let’s consider the
scenario of secure data sharing in cloud storage by applying a revocable identity-based encryption. Suppose there
are four entities involved, namely the data owner, the data
user, the cloud server and the PKG. To our best knowledge,
the existing schemes suffer from two shortcomings or at least
one of them.
• The data user needs to utilize the time key TKID,t as
well as the private key to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted
at the time t. So, the data user has to maintain all the
time keys (O(t)) (or decryption keys computed from
time keys) for different time-period decryptions. This
consumes a lot of storage resources for data users,
thus it is very impractical especially in source-limited
environments.
• When a user is revoked by the PKG for such as private
key compromise or expiring, the user can still decrypt
those ciphertexts prior to revocation in the cloud.

FIGURE 1. System model of RIBE with ciphertext evolution in the cloud.

Though some works [10] do not have these problems,
they suffer from new problems: the ciphertexts grow longer
with the number of ciphertext-transformation (the basic construction), or the costly computation and communication of
re-encryption keys between the user and the server. We give a
new and efficient RIBE scheme that can solve the two problems. As shown in Fig. 1, the cloud server helps a ciphertext C
uploaded by the data owner evolve to a new one C 0 ; then
the data user decrypts the ciphertext by employing merely its
current time key as well as private key. So,
? the data user only needs to keep one time key – the
current time key;
? and the revoked data user cannot access any ciphertext
including those before revocation;
? no matter how many times a ciphertext in the cloud
evolves, the length of the ciphertext remains unchanged;
? different to proxy re-encryption, no computation or communication is needed for the re-encryption keys.
We construct a revocable identity-based encryption scheme
with (cloud-aided) ciphertext evolution (RIBE-CE). Our
scheme is proved secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
based on the hardness of the BDH problem in the random
oracle model. We also analyze the efficiency by comparing
our scheme with the existing works.
56978

Organization of the Paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give the definition of a
cloud-aided RIBE-CE scheme and its security model against
two types of adversaries. The related mathematical notions
are also reviewed in this section. Sect. 3 presents the concrete RIBE-CE construction and the formal security proofs.
In Sect. 4, we analyze the efficiency by comparing with
other related representative works. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes
the paper.
A. RELATED WORKS

Boldyreva et al. [1] first presented a scalable revocable IBE
scheme in 2008. The complete subtree structure is used
to obtain a logarithm growth of updating key. This work
was subsequently improved in [12] with strong security.
In 2013, Seo and Emura introduced decryption-key-exposure
threat and presented a revocable IBE scheme that can
resist decryption-key-exposure [15]. Sun et al. [17] extended
Seo et al.’s scheme to the certificateless setting. In 2017,
Watanabe et al. [20] gave a new revocable and decryptionkey-exposure resistent IBE scheme. The scheme has short
public parameters in prime-order groups. A very recent work
showed a revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption
scheme [8].
Unfortunately, almost all these RIBE works suffer from
the two drawbacks mentioned above especially in the
applications like cloud storage. In 2014, Liang et al. [10]
employed proxy re-encryption technique to construct a
revocable identity-based encryption scheme. Their scheme
solves the two problems by re-encrypting ciphertexts in the
cloud. However, the ciphertexts become longer and longer
with the number of re-encryption. Reference [14] improved
Liang et al.’s scheme on the efficiency but suffers from
increasing list of decryption keys for different-period ciphertexts. References [18] and [19] pointed out the security weakness of Liang et al.’s scheme against collusion attacks. Other
related works are such as [9] and [13]. In these works,
the revocation is implemented by a third party e.g. the cloud
server. They have special applications.
II. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL
A. SCHEME DEFINITION

An RIBE-CE scheme is made up of the following algorithms.
• Setup(k): Taking a security parameter k as input, this
algorithm outputs a master secret key msk and public
parameters params.
• Private-Key-Extract(params, msk, ID):
Taking
params, msk and an identity ID as input, this algorithm
outputs a private key SKID , which is transmitted to the
user via a secret channel. It is run by the PKG
• Time-Key-Update(params, msk, ID, t):
Taking
params, msk, an identity ID and a time tag t as
input, this algorithm outputs a time key TKID,t , which
is transmitted to the user via a public channel. It is run
by the PKG
VOLUME 6, 2018
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•

•

•
•

Encrypt(params, ID, t, M ): Taking params, ID, t
and a message M as input, this algorithm outputs a
ciphertext C. It is run by the data owner.
Decrypt(params, SKID , TKID,t ): Taking params,
SKID , TKID,t and C as input, this algorithm outputs a
message M or a failure symbol. It is run by the data user.
Revoke(ID, t): Taking ID and t as input, the PKG stops
issuing the time key TKID,t for the user.
Ciphertext-Evolve(params, C, TKID,t , t 0 ): Taking
TKID,t , t 0 and C as input, this algorithm outputs a
ciphertext C 0 . It is run by the cloud server.

B. SECURITY MODEL

Two types of adversaries are considered: an outside adversary who knows all time keys; an inside adversary who is a
malicious revoked user. The cloud server can be viewed as an
outside adversary.
We define the IND-CCA security of revocable identity
based encryption with ciphertext evolution via the following
game between the challenger C and the adversary A. Let A
be Ao or Ai that denote an outside adversary or an inside
adversary, respectively.
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm to provide public parameters params to A, while keeps the master secret key msk
for itself.
Phase 1: Then, A may make some private key
queries Qprivatekey , time key queries Qtimekey , decryption queries Qdecryption and ciphertext evolution queries
Qciphertextevolution to the challenger C on its behalf. The
query-answers are described as follows.
Qprivatekey

SKID

ID

A −→ C, C −−−→ A
(ID,t)

TKID,t

Qtimekey

A −−−→ C, C −−−→ A

Qdecryption

A −−−−→ C, C −
→A

Qciphertextevolution

(C,ID,t)
CID,t

,t 0

M

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. Given
(aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 ) with a, b, c ∈R Z∗q , to compute e(P, P)abc .
III. THE CONSTRUCTION
A. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION

Generally suppose an identity based encryption scheme is
CCA
CCA
made up of four algorithms IBECCA
Setup , IBEExtract , IBEEnc
CCA
and IBEDec . We can give a generic construction of revocable
identity-based encryption with (cloud-aided) ciphertext evolution (RIBE-CE for short).
− Setup(k):
IBECCA
Setup (k) → (params, msk).
− Private-Key-Extract(params, msk, ID):
IBECCA
Extract (params, msk, ID) → SKID .
−Time-Key-Update(params, msk, ID, t):
IBECCA
Extract (params, msk, ID||t) → TKID,t ;
TKID,t is sent to both the user and the cloud server.
−Encrypt(params, ID, t, M ):
C0 = IBECCA
Enc (M , ID);
C = IBECCA
Enc (C0 , ID||t);
output the final ciphertext C.
−Decrypt(params, SKID , TKID,t , C):
C0 = IBECCA
Dec (C, TKID,t );
M = IBECCA
Dec (C0 , SKID ).

CID,t 0

A −−−−→ C, C −−−→ A

Challenge: A outputs two messages M0 and M1 of the
same length, an identity ID∗ and a time tag t ∗ . The challenger
randomly chooses β from {0, 1} and encrypts Mβ to output a
challenge ciphertext C ∗ .
Phase 2: A continues to make queries as before, subject
to the constrain that Ao cannot make a private key extraction query on ID∗ and Ai cannot make a time key query
on (ID∗ , t ∗ ).
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess β 0 ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of A in the above game is defined by
 = | Pr(β 0 = β) − 1/2|. An RIBE-CE scheme is said
to be IND-CPA (indistinguishability against chosen plaintext
attacks) secure if no PPT adversary has non-negligible .
C. BILINEAR PAIRING AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION

Bilinear paring. G1 is an additive group with prime order q
and a generator P. G2 is a multiplicative group with the same
order q. A bilinear pairing is defined as e : G1 × G1 → G2
VOLUME 6, 2018

satisfying the conditions (1) as described below.

∗
ab

Bilinearity : a, b ∈ Zq , e(aP, bP) = e(P, P) ;
(1)
Non − degeneracy : e(P, P) 6 = 1G2 ;


Computability : e(aP,bP) can be effectively computed.

−Revoke(ID, t):
The PKG does not generat the time key TKID,t .
−Ciphertext-Evolve(params, C, TKID,t , t 0 ):
C0 = IBECCA
Dec (C, TKID,t );
0
C 0 = IBECCA
Enc (C0 , ID||t );
Evolve

C −−−→ C 0 .
The security of the generic construction can be provided
by Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1: If the underlying IBE scheme is IND-CCA
secure then our generic construction of RIBE-CE is
IND-CCA secure against both an outside adversary Ao and
an inside adversary Ai .
Proof: Suppose B is an adversary against the IBE
scheme. It will acts as the challenger interacting with A. B has
a list of IBE public parameters params which is published to
A as well as some other necessary parameters. Then A may
make some queries.
56979
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Private key extraction query:
ID

•

ID

A −→ B −→ C,
SKID

SKID

C −−−→ B −−−→ A.

•

Time key query:
ID||t

ID,t

A −−→ B −−→ C,
SKID||t

SKID||t

•

C −−−−→ B −−−−→ A,
TKID,t = SKID||t .
(C,ID,t,t 0 )

Ciphertext evolution query: For A −−−−−−→ B, B
firstly searches the time key list for TKID,t and TKID,t 0 ,
then computes C0 = IBEDec (C, TKID,t ) and C 0 =

Private-Key-Extract(params, mk, ID): The PKG
computes QID = H1 (ID) and then calculates SKID =
sQID as the private key of user ID.
Time-Key-Update(params, mk, ID, t): The PKG
computes QID,t = H2 (ID, t) and then calculates
TKID,t = sQID,t as the time key of the user ID at the
time t.
Encrypt(params, M , ID, t): The data owner does the
following to encrypt a message M .
– choose σ ∈ {0, 1}l , compute r = H3 (σ, M );
– compute U = rP;
– compute
V = σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(QID,t , P0 )r );

C0

, ID||t 0 ).

IBEEnc (C0
At last, C −
→ A.
If ID has been revoked at time t 0 , TKID,t 0 is randomly
chosen by the cloud.

– compute
W = M ⊕ H5 (σ );

(C,ID,t)

Decryption query: For A −−−−→ C, firstly B uses
TKID,t to make a decryption as C0 = IBECCA
Dec (C, TKID,t ).
Then

•

C0 ,ID

B −−−→ C,

– output the ciphertext C = (U , V , W ).
Decrypt(params, C = (U , V , W ), SKID , TKID,t ):
The data user computes
σ = V ⊕ H4 (e(SKID , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U )).

M

C −
→ B,

Then it can recover the message by calculating

M

B −
→ A.
Challenge: A selects two messages (M0 , M1 ), an identity ID∗ and a time t ∗ as the challenge. B sends (M0 , M1 , ID∗ )
to its challenger then receives a challenge ciphertext C0∗ .
∗
∗ ∗
B further computes C ∗ = IBECCA
Enc (C0 , ID ||t ) by inputting
∗
∗
∗
(C0 , ID ||t ) as a message and an identity. Return C ∗ to A as
the challenge ciphertext.
A may continue to make queries as before, subject to the
following constrains
• the private key extraction query on ID∗ is not allowed;
(especially for Ao )
• the time key query on (ID∗ , t ∗ ) is not allowed; (especially for Ai )
• the decryption query on C ∗ of (ID∗ , t ∗ ) is not allowed.
Guess. In the end, A gives a guess β ∈ {0, 1}. B output
the same guess.
If A’s advantage to win the above game is , it is clear
that B’s advantage to break the IND-CCA security of the IBE
scheme is not less than .

M = W ⊕ H5 (σ ).

•

•

If the equation U = H3 (σ, M )P holds, the message M
is correct.
Revoke(ID, t): If the user ID with identity needs to be
revoked at the time t, the PKG stops generating the time
key TKID,t for the user.
Ciphertext-Evolve(params, C = (U , V , W ), ID,
TKID,t , TKID,t 0 ):
The cloud computes
V 0 = V ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t 0 , U ));

then updates the ciphertext to be C 0 = (U , V 0 , W ).
Correctness 1. To recover the plaintext from the ciphertext C = (U , V , W ), the key point is to compute σ .
So, we first verify the correctness of σ .
σ = V ⊕ H4 (e(SKID , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U ))
= σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(QID,t , P0 )r )
⊕ H4 (e(sQID , rP)) ⊕ H4 (e(sQID,t , rP))

B. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION

To be concrete, the construction can be efficient.
• Setup(k): Select two cyclic groups (G1 , +) and (G2 , ·)
of the same order q. P is a generator of G1 . e : G1 ×
G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing. Choose s ∈ Z∗q at
random and compute P0 = sP. Select four hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H3 : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → Z∗q , H4 : G2 → {0, 1}l and
H5 : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l . l is the message length.
The system parameters params are
hG1 , G2 , q, P, P0 , e, H1 , . . . , H5 i.
The master secret key mk is s.
56980

= σ ⊕ H4 (e(sQID , rP)) ⊕ H4 (e(sQID,t , rP))
⊕ H4 (e(sQID , rP)) ⊕ H4 (e(sQID,t , rP))
= σ.
Then
M = W ⊕ H5 (σ )
= M ⊕ H5 (σ ) ⊕ H5 (σ )
= M.
So, if the equation U = H3 (σ, M )P holds, the message M
is correct.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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Correctness 2. To verify the decryption on the ciphertext
after evolution C 0 = (U , V 0 , W ), we can observe that
V 0 = V ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t 0 , U ))
= σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(QID,t , P0 )r )
⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t 0 , U ))
= σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U ))
⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t , U )) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t 0 , U ))
= σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(TKID,t 0 , U ))
= σ ⊕ H4 (e(QID , P0 )r ) ⊕ H4 (e(QID,t 0 , P0 )r ).
Obviously, the V 0 in C 0 = (U , V 0 , W ) keeps the encryption
algorithm. So the decryption is also suitable to the evolving
ciphertexts.
Remark: If the data user is revoked, the cloud randomly
chooses TKID,t 0 ∈ G1 for the ciphertext evolution. From the
point of practical view, 1) the revocation is also the cloud
server’s wish; 2) the message is for the data user himself but
not for other persons. It is different from proxy re-encryption.
So, if the revoked user and the cloud server collude, though
they can access the data encrypted before revocation, we can
ignore this kind of attack.
C. THE SECURITY

Theorem 2: The hash functions are viewed as random oracles.
If there exists an outside adversary Ao against the IND-CCA
security of our scheme with advantage , making q1 times H1
hash queries and q4 times H4 hash queries, then there exists an
algorithm B that can solve the BDH problem with probability
 0 ≥ /(q1 · q4 ).
Proof: Suppose B intends to solve the BDH problem
with random instances < aP, bp, cP > and its ultimate goal
e(P, P)abc . Now it will act the challenger to interact with the
adversary Ao . In the beginning, B setups public parameters
as < G1 , G2 , q, P, P0 = aP, Hi (1 ≤ i ≤ 5) >.
Before Ao makes some queries, it selects I ∈ [1, q1 ].
Hash queries. All hash queries are answered by
randomly choosing a proper element. The detailed
query-answers are < (IDi , xi ∈R Z∗q , xi P) > for H1 , <
(IDi , , ti , yi ∈R Z∗q , yi P) > for H2 , < (σ, M , r) > for H3 ,
< (E, h) > for H4 , < (σ, h̃) > for H5 . Especially, when
i = I , B responds with H1 (IDi ) = bP.
Private key queries. When B receives a private key
query on (IDi ), it searches the H1 list for < (IDi , xi , xi P) >
and computes SKIDi = xi aP as the answer. Note that if
i = I , B aborts the game.
Time key queries. When B receives a time key query
on (IDi , ti ), it searches the H2 list for < (IDi , ti , yi , yi P) >
and computes TKIDi ,ti = yi aP as the answer.
Decryption queries. When B receives a decryption
query on (C = (U , V , W ), ID, t), it runs Decrypt(params,
C, SKID , TKID,t ) by extracting the private key SKID and the
time key TKID,t firstly. If i = I , without loss of indistinguishability from the reality, suppose the ciphertext is not
generated by Ao itself and C acts as follows.
VOLUME 6, 2018

Choose M ∈R {0, 1}l and return M as the answer;
• Select h ∈R {0, 1}l Set H4 (BDH(QID , U , P0 )) = h;
• Compute σ = V ⊕ h ⊕ H4 (TKID,t , U ) and set H5 (σ ) =
W ⊕ M;
• Pick r ∈R Z∗
q and set H3 (σ, M ) = r.
Actually, due to the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm (U =
r̃P → r̃), the equation r = r̃ holds just with negligible
probability. So, if Ao makes the H3 (σ, M ) query, the answer
is easy to be found incorrect. However, it is not difficult
to see that if the H3 (σ, M ) query occurs, Ao has made
H4 (BDH(QIDi , U , P0 )) before with non-negligible probability for the computation of σ . Since BDH(QIDi , U , P0 ) is a
BDH problem, our decryption query implementation seems
real to the adversary Ao .
After that, Ao outputs two messages (M0 , M1 ) and the
identity ID∗ and the time period t ∗ that it wants to challenge.
If ID∗ 6 = IDI , B aborts the game; otherwise, B generates a
challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (U ∗ , V ∗ , W ∗ ) by setting
•

U ∗ = cP,

V ∗ ∈R {0, 1}l ,

W ∗ ∈R {0, 1}l .

Ao continues to make more queries as before, except
the private key query on ID∗ and the decryption query
on (C ∗ , ID∗ , t ∗ ).
At the end of the game, Ao outputs its guess for β. B picks
a tuple (E, h) at random from the H4 list and outputs the E as
the solution to the BDH problem.
Analysis. If B does not abort the game and Ao can break
the IND-CCA security of the scheme with advantage , B can
solve the BDH problem with probability  0 ≥ /q4 . Clearly,
the game will not abort if ID∗ = IDI . So,  0 ≥ /(q1 · q4 ).
Theorem 3: The hash functions are viewed as random
oracles. If there exists an inside adversary Ai against the
IND-CCA security of our scheme with advantage , making
q2 times H2 hash queries and q4 times H4 hash queries, then
there exists an algorithm B that can solve the BDH problem
with probability  0 ≥ /(q2 · q4 ).
Proof: In this proof, B is still a solver to the BDH
problem with random instances < aP, bp, cP > and its goal
is to compute e(P, P)abc . It acts as the challenger interacting with the adversary Ai . B setups public parameters as
< G1 , G2 , q, P, P0 = aP, Hi (1 ≤ i ≤ 5) >.
Before Ai makes queries, it selects I ∈ [1, q2 ] and suppose
the I th query to the H2 oracle is on (ID∗ , t ∗ ).
Hash queries. All hash queries are answered by
randomly choosing a proper element. The detailed
query-answers are < (IDi , xi ∈R Z∗q , xi P) > for H1 , <
(IDi , , tj , y ∈R Z∗q , yP) > for H2 , < (σ, M , r) > for H3 ,
< (E, h) > for H4 , < (σ, h̃) > for H5 . Especially, when
(IDi , tj ) = (ID∗ , t ∗ ), B responds with H2 (IDi , tj ) = bP.
Private key queries. When B receives a private key
query on (IDi ), it searches the H1 list for < (IDi , xi , xi P) >
and computes SKIDi = xi aP as the answer.
Time key queries. When B receives a time key query
on (IDi , tj ), it searches the H2 list for < (IDi , tj , y, yP) >
and computes TKIDi ,tj = yaP as the answer. Note that if
(IDi , tj ) = (ID∗ , t ∗ ), B aborts the game.
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Decryption queries. When B receives a decryption
query on (C = (U , V , W ), ID, t), it runs Decrypt(params,
C, SKID , TKID,t ) by extracting the private key SKID and the
time key TKID,t firstly. If (IDi , tj ) = (ID∗ , t ∗ ), without loss of
indistinguishability from the reality, suppose the ciphertext is
not generated by Ai itself and C works as follows.
• Choose M ∈R {0, 1}l and return M as the answer;
• Select h ∈R {0, 1}l Set H4 (BDH(QID,t , U , P0 )) = h;
• Compute σ = V ⊕ h ⊕ H4 (SKID , U ) and set H5 (σ ) =
W ⊕ M;
• Pick r ∈R Z∗
q and set H3 (σ, M ) = r.
Similarly, due to the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm
(U = r̃P → r̃), the equation r = r̃ holds just with
negligible probability. So, if Ai makes the H3 (σ, M ) query,
the answer is easy to be found incorrect. However, it is not
difficult to see that if the H3 (σ, M ) query occurs, Ai has
made H4 (BDH(QID,t , U , P0 )) before with non-negligible
probability for the computation of σ . Since to compute BDH(QID,t , U , P0 ) is a hard problem, our decryption
simulation seems real to the adversary Ai .
After that, Ai launches the challenge by outputting two
messages (M0 , M1 ) and an identity ID∗ and a time period t ∗ .
B generates a challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (U ∗ , V ∗ , W ∗ ) by
setting
U ∗ = cP,

V ∗ ∈R {0, 1}l ,

TABLE 1. Comparison of computation.

TABLE 2. Comparison.

TABLE 3. Notations.

W ∗ ∈R {0, 1}l .

Ai continues to make more queries as before, except
the time key query on (ID∗ , t ∗ ) and the decryption query
on (C ∗ , ID∗ , t ∗ ).
At the end of the game, Ai outputs its guess for β. B picks
a tuple (E, h) at random from the H4 list and outputs the E as
the solution to the BDH problem.
Analysis. Similar to the analysis of the above proof, If B
does not abort the game and Ai can break the IND-CCA
security of the scheme with advantage , B can solve the BDH
problem with probability  0 ≥ /q4 . Since the probability
that the game does not abort is 1/q2 , the probability  0 ≥
/(q2 · q4 ).

the decryption key list and the ciphertext after evolution;
b) whether the ciphertexts prior to revocation are still available to the revoked user; c) the security level and the party
implementing revocation. Table 3 describes the notations.
From the comparisons above, except for the comparable
efficiency to the existing schemes in encryption and decryption, we can see that our scheme performs better in the
following aspects:
• more efficient in generations of private key, time key,
decryption key and re-encryption key, and decryption;
• solving the two problems simultaneously with constant
ciphertext after evolutions in the cloud.

D. THE EFFICIENCY

This section evaluates the efficiency by comparing our
scheme with some representative related schemes [15], [10]
and [14]. We build the experiment platform on a windows 10 machine which is equiped with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-4460S CPU colcked at 2.9GHZ and 4GB system memory.
The cryptography library that we choose is JPBC Library.
The element length of group G1 and G2 in our scheme is
512-bit. For a 128-bit message, the running time for PrivateKey-Extract, Time-Key-Update, Encrypt, Decrypt and
Ciphertext-Evolve is 13ms, 13ms, 33ms, 16ms and 8ms,
respectively. Table 1 makes efficiency comparison via main
calculations, the exponential computation and the bilinear
pairing. The algorithms include 1) generations of private key,
time key, decryption key and re-encryption key; 2) encryption, decryption and ciphertext evolution. Then we make
further comparison in Table 2, including a) the length of
56982

IV. CONCLUSION

This paper focussed on the user revocation problem in
identity-based encryption. One of the efficient revocation
methods is to issue time keys periodically via public channels
for non-revoked users. We take the scenario of cloud storage
as consideration and find that most of the existing works
suffer from increasing decryption key list or accessability
to ciphertexts prior to revocation. Though the technique of
proxy re-encryption can solve the two problems, the length of
the ciphertexts grow linearly with the number of ciphertextevolutions. Therefore, it is a heavy burden to the server when
the data is big. Additionally, the users have to put more computation and communication resource on re-encryption keys.
This is not suitable for source-limited applications. In this
paper, we presented an efficient solution to the two aforementioned problems simultaneously. The size of a ciphertext
VOLUME 6, 2018
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in the cloud remains constant, no matter how many times the
ciphertext evolves. The new revocable identity-based encryption with ciphertext evolution scheme is constructed by using
bilinear parings. The time keys are generated by the PKG
periodically and sent to both the user and the cloud. The cloud
makes ciphertext evolution by using the time keys. Hence,
no extra key computations are involved in our construction.
It is efficient for the data sharing application in the cloud.
Our scheme enjoys provably strong security against chosen
ciphertext attacks based on standard hard problem.
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